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Abstract 
This study investigates the monetary policy rule including money growth and optimal Ramsey policy in restraining the 
stock market Fluctuations. We apply a new Keynesian monetary framework with nominal wage and price rigidities 
within a DSGE model for Iranian economy. 
Bubbles in our model emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism supported by self-fulfilling beliefs. The 
sentiment shock, which represents the size of current bubbles relative to newly born bubbles, causing bubbles 
movement and it transfers to the real economy through endogenous credit constraint. Moreover, this study investigates 
the impulse and response between sentiment shock and fluctuation in aggregate variables. 
Our empirically findings show that: first, applying Ramsey optimal monetary policy decreases the central bank’s loss 
function, relative to monetary policy rule with money growth. Second, the sentiment shock drives the movements of 
stock market fluctuations and variations in real economy, leading to explain the positive contemporaneous correlation 
between stock prices and the real economy and it helps explaining the business cycles in Iran. 
Keywords: DSGE model, New Keynesian, Optimal Monetary Policy, Stock Market Fluctuations. 
1. Introducation 
In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, evidence shows that asset price bubbles and their collapse typically 
precede financial crises. There was a strong consensus about the importance of achieving a low and stable inflation rate 
as the main goal of monetary policy in the last two decades. Accordingly, identifying the monetary policy conduction in 
a stock market bubble and the appropriate policy responses to these fluctuations and their impacts on macroeconomic 
variables are important. Therefore, this paper aims to provide a theoretical and empirical study to address this question: 
How should monetary policy be conducted in stock market bubbles? 
In recent years there has been increasing interest in research relating to explore the monetary policy and asset market 
(see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1999, 2001; Cecchetti et al. 2002; Bernanke 2002; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005; 
Robinson and Stone 2006; Roubini 2006; Christiano et al. 2008, 2010; Castelnuovo and Nistico 2010; Funke et al. 
2010; Gali 2011; Ikeda 2013). The role of monetary policy that should play within bubbles has become the main 
concern of policy-makers in many countries in last decades. Many authors and policy makers argue on appropriate 
response to asset prices and financial conditions specially and more broadly during financial crises.  
The consensus view among most policy makers in response to these fluctuations before the financial crisis was that 
central banks should focus on controlling inflation and the output gap, and the growth of financial asset prices should 
ignore, unless the asset price fluctuations appear as a threat to the stability of inflation and output (see, e.g., Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Bernanke, 2002; Kohn, 2006, 2008). Later, that view was fractured, reigniting the debate on 
achieving stable low inflation for ensuring financial stability is not adequate, and the central bank should pay attention 
to asset price volatility and its following crisis (see, e.g., Cecchetti et al. 2000; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Leijonhufvud, 
2007; Gali, 2011). Therefore, the optimal role of monetary policy to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble 
and stabilization of aggregate demand has been the subject of a debate. 
For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) in two influential papers provide important insights about monetary 
policy and asset price volatility. Their basic idea is that central banks should view price stability and financial stability 
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as highly complementary and mutually consistent objectives. They made the case that monetary policy should respond 
to asset prices only to the extent that they have implications for future inflation. Gali (2011) examine the impact of 
alternative monetary policy rules on a rational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model 
with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interest rates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the 
fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. The optimal monetary policy seeks to strike a 
balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. His main findings call into question 
the theoretical foundations of the case for "leaning against the wind" monetary policies. Monetary tightening in an asset 
price bubble raises the real interest rate that accelerates the bubble growth.  
Ikeda (2013) present an estimated monetary DSGE model of asset price bubble and agency costs in firm’s price setting 
decisions. In his model following Miao et.al (2013), bubbles emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism 
supported by self-fulfilling beliefs. He also introduces nominal price and wage rigidities in the model. He argues that 
inflation remains moderate in the boom, because a loosing in financial tightness lowers the agency costs and adds 
downward pressure on inflation. The optimal monetary policy calls for monetary tightening to restrain the boom at the 
cost of greater volatility in inflation. Furthermore, he investigates the importance of sentiment shock in explaining the 
movements of stock market fluctuations and variations in real economy.  
This paper investigates the monetary policy rule in restraining the stock market fluctuations with applying dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models under two alternative monetary policy rule, one with money growth and the other 
with optimal Ramsey policy respectively, since there is not any empirical and theoretical study on assessing the 
relationship between monetary policy and asset market bubbles for Iranian economy. 
In this study, we develop Ikeda’s monetary DSGE model with appropriate framework for Iranian economy, and this 
study contributes to the literature in several aspects compare to Ikeda’s. First, this paper sets up a calibrated model 
which we employ quarterly Iranian data. Second, we consider a small economy with oil export which is subject to oil 
price shocks frequently. Third, we apply “Money in Utility” approach which looks more plausible to utilize for studying 
Iranian economy. Fourth, in addition to the TFP shock, the monetary policy shock, the government spending shock, the 
sentiment shock such as study by Ikeda (2013), we study the oil income shock. Fifth, this paper uses different 
specifications for balancing government budget, which are financed through lump-sum taxation to households, oil 
income and issuing money. Sixth, we consider monetary regime including money growth and optimal Ramsey policy 
under which the Ramsey planner maximizes the representative household’s welfare, taking private sector optimizing 
decisions to study the Iran’s central bank behavior. Therefore, this model can help us to analysis the effect of stock 
market bubbles on macroeconomic variables in economy. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines our model. Section 3 discusses the data and calibrated 
parameters. Section 4 presents and interprets our main results, and finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Method 
We consider an infinite-horizon economy that consists of wholesale goods firms, retailers, final goods firms, investment 
goods firms, households, government and the central bank. Households maximize their utility function subject to a 
budget constraint, and supply labor to wholesale goods firms. Wholesale goods firms which produces wholesale goods 
own capital, and they use an identical technology to combine capital and labor in order to produce goods. They are 
subject to credit constraint because of which a stock price bubble emerges. Retailers are acting in monopolistically 
competitive markets, and transforming one unit of wholesale goods into one unit of retail goods. Retailers face nominal 
price rigidities. Final goods firms purchase the retail goods and combine them to produce final goods. Investment goods 
firms produce investment or capital goods subject to adjustment costs. Wholesale goods firms purchase capital goods 
from investment goods producers. Model setup is based on new Keynesian framework with nominal rigidity in both 
wages and prices. The government in this economy spends resources on consumption of the final goods, and the central 
bank conducts monetary policies in the economy. The Ramsey planner maximizes the representative household’s 
welfare. International trade depends on oil market and it is one of the sources of financing the government budget. 
Model is inspired by Miao et al. (2013) and Ikeda (2013), and it can help us to analysis the effect of stock market 
bubbles on macroeconomic variables in economy. 
2.1 Households 
There is a continuum of identical households placed on unit interval with measure unity,  𝑗 ∈ [0,1]. Each household 
obtains utility from consumption, leisure and holding money balances according to the following discounted utility 
function,  
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where   is the subjective discount factor, tE  is the expectation operator, h  is habit persistence in preferences, 
whereas   and L  are weights associated with utility from money holdings and leisure, respectively. Moreover, tC  
indicates consumption, tL  indicates labor, tM  indicate the nominal money balances, and tP  indicates the price of 
final goods. 
This representative household maximizes his utility function subject to a budget constraint, 
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here tW  is nominal wage, tD  is nominal bonds, 1te  is stock holdings, tR is nominal interest rate, tS  is average stock 
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s
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p
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where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint in period t . Using equation (5), demand for real money 
balances could derive from equation (4),  
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where, the real demand of money is a function of interest rate, price level and consumption. In equilibrium, demand and 
supply of money are equal; therefore, money market equilibrium determines the interest rate. 
Following Christiano et al. (2005) and Ikeda (2013), a household can optimize its wage rate with probability w1  in 
each period. With probability w , the household cannot optimize its wage; in this case it sets its wage rate )( jWt as 
follows, 
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where t  denotes the gross rate of inflation,   denotes steady state inflation and lw is the wage indexation to product 
past inflation and the past growth rate of TFP. If household 
thj had reset the wage in period t  and kept it constant until 
st  , the wage could be  expressed as 
w
stttst jWjW   ,)()( . 
The wage-setting problem can be expressed from maximizing the household utility (1) subject to demand curve for 
labor, 
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The wage-setting equation is as follows (see the Appendix A.1-A.2 for derivation): 
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(9) 
Real effective wage is define as tttt APWw /ˆ  , and relative wage is define as ttt WWw / , which is the ratio of 
optimized wage to aggregate wage level (which includes both optimizers and non-optimizers), and tttt AP ˆ . In the 
Calvo setup, because optimizers (and hence non-optimizers) are randomly chosen from the population, the average 
wage of non-optimizers in 1t  (which must keep their wage constant) is equal to the overall wage index in 1t  no 
matter when they optimized for the last time. Hence, )( jWt depends only on aggregate states, and j  is omitted 
hereafter. According to Appendix A.3 dividing through by 1tW and rearranging yields the relative wage of optimizers 
as an increasing function of the inflation rate, 
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Following the household wage-setting maximization problem in equation (9), we can transform the wage setting 
condition as follows. 
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2.2 Wholesale good Firms 
There is a continuum of wholesale good firms, indexed by j . Firms which produce wholesale goods own capital, and 
they use an identical technology to combine capital 
j
tK  and labor 
j
tL  to produce goods 
j
tY  with the following 
production function, 
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where 
j
tI ,  , 
j
t  denote respectively investment, the capital depreciation rate, the idiosyncratic shock to investment.  
The j
t  is iid across firms and over time and follows the Pareto distribution   as follows, 
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In order to formulate the financial friction in capital market, it is assumed that the wholesale good firms have to finance 
the cost of investment and working capital at the beginning of production process. Let )( jt
j
t KV represents the stock 
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market value of the firm with assets j
tK at time t . The wholesale good firm 
thj  faces a borrowing constraint, given by, 
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where e  is the probability by which a firm may exit the market and has no value. Similar to Miao et al. (2013), firm j  
pledges a fraction )1,0( of capital stock jtK  as the collateral at the beginning of period t . Therefore, the 
parameter   reflects the friction of collateral in the credit market and represents the degree of financial market 
imperfections. The stock market value of the collateral is equal to )()/( 11
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As the investment is irreversible at firm level, the firm’s value satisfies the following Bellman equation with 
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The first-order condition with respect to
j
tL  yields the following equations, 
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Substituting the above expression into problem (19) the wholesale firm problem maximizing yields, 
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Following Miao et al. (2013) and Ikeda (2013), the value of firm is conjectured to take the following form: 
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decide to lend more to firm j ; then firm j  can borrow and invest more, thereby making its assets indeed more 
valuable. This process is self-fulfilling and a bubble may sustain. 
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Using (23), (25), (26), (27) and capital stock (16), problem (19) can be written as (see the Appendix A.4 for 
derivation): 
j
t
j
tt
j
t
I
t
j
tt
j
t
j
t
I
j
t
j
t
j
t BKQIPQKRBKQ j
t
  ,
}0{
, )1()(max 

 
(28) 
By maximizing problem (28) subject to credit constraint (24) and definition of value of firm (25), the investment 
defines as follows: 
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Following Miao et al. (2013), the cost of one unit of investment is the purchasing price
I
tP . The benefit how that is the 
marginal tQ . Because of lineality in
j
tI , it is straightforward that the constraint is binding and the investment is 
maximized when 
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Substituting the investment rule (29) into problem (28) gives, 
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Matching coefficients yields: 
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where, 
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Substituting 
j
tQ  and 
j
tB , from equations (32) and (33) in equation (26) and (27) yield:  
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Equation (35) is the discounted marginal value of capital. The dividends from capital consist of the net return
j
tR 1 , the 
value of depreciated capital )1(1 tQ  and the investment benefit 
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increase in capital. 
Equation (36) determines the bubble. The bubble generates dividends and it increases the borrowing capacity. This 
allows the firm to make more investment, generating additional dividends for the idiosyncratic shock, 
j
t 1  at time  
1t . 
2.3 Retailers  
There is a continuum of firms indexed by i , on the interval )1,0( . They purchase wholesale good at price wtP  and 
transform one unit of wholesale good into one unit of specialized retail good, )(iYt . 
2.4 Final Goods Firms 
There is a chain of final good producers, operating under perfect competition. The firm produces the final good tY  by 
continuum combining retail goods, using the CES technology: 
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(37) 
where pp  1  governs the degree of substitution between types of goods. The representative firm takes the price of 
final goods, tP , and the price of retail goods, )(iPt , as given. Profit maximization leads to the following first order 
condition (see the Appendix A.6 for derivation); 
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Model setup is based on new Keynesian framework while prices are sticky in a time dependent manner. We assume that 
firms set prices according to a variant of the mechanism suggested by Calvo (1983). In each period, a retailer faces a 
constant probability, 110  p , of being able to reoptimize its nominal price. The ability to reoptimize its price is 
independent across firms and time. Firms that cannot reoptimize their price simply index to lagged inflation. The 
thi  
retailer’s problem is: 
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subject to the demand curve (38), with 
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(40) 
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where   is inflation and ]1,0[lp indicates the degree of indexation to past prices, for firms which are not allowed to 
re-optimize. 
Therefore, the criterion facing a firm presented with the opportunity to reprice, when )(iP st is expressed as 
p
stttst iPiP   ,)()( and with substituting the )(iP st  and )(iY st , is given by (see the Appendix A.7 for 
derivation); 
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Consequently, the first-order condition associated to the profit is (see the Appendix A.8 for derivation); 
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As a result the price-level in our models evolves in the following way, in which dividing through by 1tP and 
rearranging yields the relative price of optimizers as an increasing function of the inflation rate (see the Appendix A.9 
for derivation); 
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(43) 
Following the price-setting maximization problem in equation (41), we can transform the price setting condition as 
follows. 
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(46) 
2.5 Investment Goods Firms 
There are competitive investment goods producers with the CEE
1
 investment adjustment costs. They produce 
investment goods from final goods subject to adjustment costs and sell those to wholesale firm with price 
I
tP (see, 
Christiano et al., 2005; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). The objective function of a capital producer is to choose tI  to 
solve: 
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(47) 
where z is the steady-state growth rate of aggregate investment, "S is the adjustment cost. The optimal level of 
investment goods satisfies the first-order condition: 
                                                        
1 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) 
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(48) 
2.6 Government and Central Bank 
This model also contains central bank and government. The government in this economy spends resources on 
government consumption of final goods and its aim is to keep balanced budget every period. The central bank is 
dependent on government. Hence, we cannot model government and central bank in the separate sections. 
We assume that international trade in Iran depends on oil market and it is one of the sources for financing the 
government budget. Iranian economy is a price taker and its international trade is limited to oil exports. Therefore, 
the inclusion of oil revenues in the model like most of general equilibrium models for oil-producing countries 
follows the first order autoregresive process.   
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(49) 
where ),0(...~
2
, ortor Ndii  denotes the oil revenue shock, or  is the steady-state amount of oil income. 
Due to the structure of the Iranian economy, the monetary authority applies in a way that the oil revenues implicitly 
impact the monetary condition. The growth rate of money is considered the first order autoregresive process. In 
addition, oil income shocks can affect the planned growth rate of money. In other words, the growth rate of the 
money can be displayed as follows; 
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 (51) 
where tmg ,  and 
r
tm denote the nominal money growth and real money balances, respectively. Moreover, 
),0(...~ 2, mptmp Ndii  shows a monetary policy shock,  represents the effect of oil revenue shocks on money 
growth in Iranian economy. 
The government expenditure and subsidies are financed through lump-sum taxation to households, oil income and 
issuing money; therefore, the government runs a balanced budget every period as, 
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(52) 
Government conducts fiscal policy and sets the amount of expenditure tGA according to )1(AR process:  
        tgtggt GAGAGA ,1lnln1ln     
(53) 
The expression tg , denotes an iid  normal government spending shock with mean zero and standard deviation 
2
g . In 
the model, the supply of nominal bonds is fixed at zero. 
2.7 Bubble 
Following Miao et al. (2013), a sentiment shock t is interduced to model households’ beliefs about the fluctuations in 
bubbles. Households are assumed to believe that the relative size of the bubbles at date t for any two firms born at 
date t  and 1t  evolves according to  
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(54) 
where 
t
j
tt PBb /,,    denote the real average bubble of firm with age  in period t . Then t  follows an exogenously 
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given process: 
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(55) 
where ),0(...~
2
,   Ndiit . Following Miao et al. (2013) and Ikeda (2013), household beliefs about the movement 
of bubbles may change randomly over time. It evolves as, 
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It is clear from the equation that the sizes of new bubbles, 
*
tb  and old bubbles, ,tb  are linked by the sentiment shock. 
The sentiment shock affects current bubbles relative to a newly born bubble in next period.  
In the paper following Miao et al. (2013) and Ikeda (2013), the total bubble born in period t  with probability e , which 
implies the firms with bubble in its stock price and exit the market, is given by: 
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where, 
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(58) 
The bubble is stationary in the neighborhood of steady state as long as 
1)1(   e . From (36), (57) the total bubble 
evolves according to, 
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Equations (58) and (59) show that a sentiment shock t  affects the relative size tm  and hence the total bubble.
2
 
2.8 Ramsey Equilibrium 
A Ramsey planner chooses an allocation and nominal interest rates among those satisfying equilibrium conditions 
(without a monetary policy rule) to maximize the average household’s utility. I follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) 
to solve for a Ramsey equilibrium. In this case a policy instrument is nominal interest rates, tR . Let tx  and ts  denote 
endogenous variables and exogenous predetermined variables respectively. The competitive equilibrium conditions in 
this economy can be written as 
0),,,,,( 111  ttttttt RssxxxCE  
(60) 
The period -t objective function of the Ramsey planner is written as 
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(61) 
where 
                                                        
2 A firm whose stock price has been inflated by a bubble is able to borrow more than firms whose stock price is not inflated. The additional borrowing 
allows firm to take advantage of high return of investment available and to make more profits if it is hit by a great idiyosyncratic shock in the next 
period. These additional benefits are summarized by in equation (59). 
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The Ramsey planner chooses 
'' ],[ ttt Rxf  to maximize the discounted sum of period utility. The portion of the 
Lagrangean associated with the Ramsey planner’s optimization problem that is relevant for the purpose of computing 
optimal policy from the timeless perspective is given by 
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(62) 
The first-order condition of the problem with respect to tf  is 
0
)1()()1()1()(
'
'
''
'
''
'
'
1
'' 11

















t
t
ttt
t
t f
tC
E
f
tC
f
tC
f
tU
E
f
tU
ttt
  
(63) 
Where ),,()( 1 ttt sxxUtU   and ),,,,,()( 111 tttttt RssxxxCtC  . 
2.9 Loss Function 
As Bernanke and Gutler (1999) explain, the quantitative criteria used to assess the policy rule’s performance are the 
unconditional variances of output and inflation, which are obtained by simulating the model for alternative policy 
regimes. These criteria are consistent with the formal quadratic loss function. The central bank minimizes the loss 
function to drive the appropriate policy responses to economic fluctuations.  Following Boostani (2013), we use the 
equation as follows, 
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2.10 Aggregation and Equilibrium 
Aggregating 
j
tL , given by (21), over idiosyncratic shocks, 
j
t  yields the demand for labor as follows; 
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Aggregating demand for labor over j yields; 
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where the demand for labor, tL , must be equal to its supply, 
*
tL .  
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(67) 
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Aggregating output over an idiosyncractic shock 
j
t yields (see the Appendix A.10 for derivation), 
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Aggregating over j yields; 
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Where the supply of whole sale good, 
*
tY ,must be equal to its demand, tY ; 
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Aggregating investment over an idiosyncractic shock 
j
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(71) 
As Ikeda expressed, the first term in equation (71) describes the amount of borrowing of wholesale goods firms and the 
second term denotes the amount of borrowing assigned to working capital for firms conducting investment. Therefore, 
this equation represents the amount of investment in final goods. 
Following Ikeda (2013), there are newly born firms that collect a fraction   of capital stock accumulated by exit firms. 
Then, the aggregate capital stock of all firms in the end of period t  after the realization of an exit shock is 
'
11 )1(   teet KK   
(72) 
'
1tK  denotes the capital stock in the end of period t  before the realization of the exit shock, is given by; 
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(73) 
A competitive equilibrium consists of stochastic processes of 26 aggregate endogenous 
variables, t
C
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, which satisfies (3), (4), (5), (6), (10), (11), (12), (13), (20), (30), (35), (43), (44),  (45),  (46), (48), 
(49), (50), (51), (53), (58), (59), (65), (69), (71) and (73). 
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3. Data and Calibrated Parameters 
Our model is stationary in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) shock, we transform the equilibrium system 
into a stationary one. Moreover, we use a calibrated model to fit the model for Iranian data. Our model has five shocks: 
the TFP shock, the monetary policy shock, the government spending shock, the sentiment shock and the oil revenue 
shock.   
We calibrate some of the parameters of the model. Some key parameters is evaluated based on previous studies suck as 
Ikeda (2013), Miao et al. (2013) and some are based on authors for maximum compatibility simulated data with real 
data. In brief, Table (1) and (2) present the values assigned to the calibrated parameters. 
Table1. Key Parameters 
Parameters Explanation Value Resource 
e  Exit rate of firms 0.01 Ikeda (2013) 
   Fraction of firms investing in SS 0.17 Ikeda (2013) 
  Credit constraint 0.11 Ikeda (2013) 
  Preference discount rate 0.99 Boostani (2013) 
  Inverse Frisch elasticity 2.17 Taee (2007) 
p  Price markup 1.15 Ikeda (2013) 
w  Wage markup 1.15 Ikeda (2013) 
z  TFP growth shocks, AR 0.92 Afshari et. al (2014) 
q  weights associated with utility of money-holdings  1.32 Davoodi and Zarepour (2007) 
 
Table 2. Key Parameters with Authors 
Parameters Explanation Value Explanation 
  Capital income share 0.38 C/Y is equal to 0.53 
  Capital depreciation rate 0.05 I/Y is equal to 0.24 
"S  Investment adjustment costs 0.1 I/Y is equal to 0.24 
  SS quarterly inflation 1.0041 In data 
  Start-up capital 1 In Model 
z  SS TFP growth rate 1 In Model 
h  Consumption habit 0.8 In data 
p  Calvo prices 0.5 In Model 
w  Calvo wages 0.75 In Model 
lp  Price indexation 0.5 In Model 
lw  Wage indexation 0.5 In Model 
mp  Monetary policy shocks, AR 0.29 )1(AR process 
g  Government spending shocks, AR 0.11 )1(AR process 
or  Oil revenue shocks, AR 0 )1(AR process 
  Sentiment shocks, AR 0.82 St.D of PS is 19 
  effect of  oil revenue shocks on money growth 0.001 )1(AR process 
rm  SS amount of real money balances 1 In Model 
mg  SS amount of nominal money growth 1.0041 In data 
or  SS amount of oil income 0.071 Oil/G is equal to 0.46 
GA  SS government expenditure 0.15 G/Y is equal to 0.13 
L  Log hours in SS 0.28 In Model 
z  TFP growth shocks, Std 0.004 St.D of I is 6.24 
mp  Monetary policy shocks, Std 0.01 Residual of )1(AR process 
g  Government spending shocks, Std 0.046 Residual of )1(AR process 
  Sentiment shocks, Std 0.03 St.D of PS is 19 
or  Oil revenue shocks, Std 0.5 Residual of )1(AR process 
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4. Results 
The model’s empirical implications based on the calibrated parameters are computed using the simulated data (20,000 
periods). This paper uses quarterly data of the Iranian economy covering the period of 1986-2012. All series are logged 
and detrended with the HP filter. The columns labeled Y , C, I, G, PS, Oil and M refer, respectively, to real per capita 
GDP, real per capita consumption, real per capita investment, real per capita government expenditure, real per capita oil 
income, real per capita stock prices and real per capita money balances.  
We present the ratio of actual and simulated variables relative to Y in Table (3). As Table (3) indicates, the estimated 
model fits the empirical moments from the actual data quite well.  
Table 3. The Ratio of real economic and simulated variables relative to Y 
 C/Y I/Y G/Y Oil/G 
Data 0.5376 0.2452 0.1300 0.4688 
Baseline Model 0.6033 0.2149 0.1817 0.4733 
       Source: Authors calculation 
Table 4. Business Cycles Statistics (In Percent) 
Standard Deviations 
 Y C I G PS 
Data 2.71 3.16 6.24 4.62 19.99 
Baseline Model 3.03 3.56 6.92 4.60 10.00 
Optimal Monetary Policy 2.86 3.24 7.06 4.63 10.08 
Standard Deviations Relative to Y 
Data 1.00 1.16 2.30 1.70 7.33 
Baseline Model 1.00 1.17 2.28 1.52 3.29 
Optimal Monetary Policy 1.00 1.13 2.46 1.61 3.52 
Correlation with Y 
Data 1.00 0.50 0.77 0.32 0.32 
Baseline Model 1.00 0.85 0.67 0.23 0.82 
Optimal Monetary Policy 1.00 0.82 0.68 0.25 0.88 
Source: Authors calculation 
To evaluate our model performance, we present in Table 4 the baseline model’s predictions regarding standard 
deviations, standard deviations relative to output and correlations with output. This table also presents results for the 
two comparison models. The model moments are computed using the simulated data from the when all shocks are 
turned on. From Table 4, we observe that our calibrated model fits the empirical moments from the actual data quite 
well. Moreover, it explains the stock market volatility in the data. Most models in finance or macroeconomics have 
difficulty in explaining the stock market volatility (Shiller, 1981). Furthermore, the persistence of macroeconomic 
variables and stock prices are matched as well as their comovements. Our calibrated model with bubbles identifies the 
sentiment shock and provides a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism for this shock.  
We use variance decomposition to evaluate the relative importance of the five structural shocks in driving fluctuations 
in the stock prices and macroeconomic quantities at the business cycle frequency. Table (5) reports the variance 
decomposition across the shocks. 
 
Table 5. Variance Decomposition (in percentage) 
  Sentiment TFP Monetary 
Policy Shock 
Oil income Government 
Output Baseline Model 46.37 0.42 47.46 0.12 5.63 
Ramsey Optimal Policy 76.26 5.45 11.33 0.00 6.96 
Consumption Baseline Model 65.20 6.87 27.66 0.07 0.20 
Ramsey Optimal Policy 94.93 3.47 1.49 0.00 0.11 
Investment Baseline Model 8.35 17.13 72.90 0.18 1.44 
Ramsey Optimal Policy 27.15 40.55 30.89 0.00 1.41 
Stock Price Baseline Model 92.43 0.50 6.98 0.02 0.07 
Ramsey Optimal Policy 98.31 0.14 1.48 0.00 0.07 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Table (5) shows that the sentiment shock in baseline model explains about 47, 65 and 8 percent of the fluctuations in 
output, consumption and investment respectively. The sentiment shock is the dominating force driving the fluctuations 
in consumption. This is due to the large wealth effect caused by the fluctuations in the stock market value. As Table (5) 
indicates the sentiment shock accounts for about 92 percent of the stock market fluctuations. The contributions of the 
other shocks are negligible. Moreover, the sentiment shock in Ramsey equilibrium explains about 76, 95, 27 and 98 
percent of the fluctuations in output, consumption, investment and stock price respectively. The optimal monetary 
policy performs the same as monetary policy rule with money growth in explaining stock price fluctuations.  
The money growth shock is important in explaining variations in macroeconomic quantities, but the oil income shock 
does not explain much of the fluctuations in output, consumption, investment, and stock price. According equation (51), 
oil income shocks affect money growth and this rise affects on macroeconomic variables much. 
The government’s consumption shock reports a tiny fraction of fluctuations in stock prices, investment, consumption, 
except output.  
The TFP shock plays a critical role on economic fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. The TFP shock is correlated 
with consumption and investment. However, it does not explain much of the fluctuations in output and stock price. TFP 
shock due to changes in the marginal product of capital and labor will cause households to optimally respond to these 
changes. This release mechanism led to changes in the economy. While a change in government spending makes no 
transition mechanism and the effects of government spending shock in the economy is limited. The TFP shock in 
optimal monetary policy explains about 41 percent of the fluctuations in investment and performs differently from 
monetary policy rule with money growth.  
As indicated in Figure (1) and (2), we consider the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation five structural shocks 
in driving fluctuations in macroeconomic quantities and stock price at the business cycle frequency.  
In the case of positive oil shock, the oil income increases and it leads to budget surplus, increases the output, 
consumption, inflation, investment, hours worked. It raises marginal Q, the bubble and the stock price. 
In addition, Figure (1) and (2) shows the response function of macro variables relative to government’s consumption 
shock in base model with money growth. Increasing in government expenditure is the fiscal policy and it raises the 
output. It causes to money transactions grow and interest rate growth. With decrease of available credit and crowding 
out effect also reduces investment throughout few quarters.  
The prices decline in response to the government consumption shock. It raises the present value of the stream of taxes 
over time which generates a negative wealth effect that brings down private consumption. The government expenditure 
shock reduces the marginal Q, the bubble and leads to negative effect on the stock price. 
From Figure (1), the money growth shock increases demand and leads to increase the output and consumption. It 
increases inflation and raises the marginal Q, the bubble and the stock price. This shock plays a critical role on Iranian 
economic fluctuations. As indicated in Table (5) in money growth model, it explains much of the fluctuations in output, 
consumption, investment and stock price after the sentiment shock. 
As indicated in Figure (2), a monetary policy shock reduces the output, consumption, inflation, investment, labor hours, 
the marginal Q, the bubble and stock price. Because of the positive interest rate shock the rental rate of capital increases 
and it leads to reduce the investment and output. Due to this rise, the desire to invest in banks increases and afterward it 
cause to reduce the stock price. Therefore, the optimal monetary policy responses perform differently from the 
monetary policy rule with money growth in explaining the impulses of monetary policy shocks.  
A Positive TFP shock increases output, labor supply and investment, but it reduces the future marginal utility of 
consumption due to the wealth effect. TFP shock raises both marginal Q and the bubble, and its net impact on the stock 
price is positive. It cannot be an important driver of the stock market movements. The occurrence of a positive 
technology shock, capital and labor productivity goes up. As a result, firms increase demand for labor and capital. And 
labor income and rental rate of capital increase. The increase in supply of capital and labor leads to production increase. 
Figure (1) and (2) presents the impact of a sentiment shock. These Figures plot the responses to a positive sentiment 
shock under two alternative monetary policy rule including money growth and Ramsey monetary policy respectively. 
Both monetary policy rules do restrain a stock price boom by raising real interest rates sharply. The responses of the 
variables such as output, consumption, investment, bubble, marginal Q and stock price in Ramsey monetary policy 
become close to those under the monetary regimes including money growth. However, the quantities of the increases in 
real variables such as output, consumption and investment are limited under the monetary policy with money growth, 
relative to the optimal monetary policy. A positive sentiment shock raises the size of the bubble. It causes the credit 
constraints to be relaxed. Thus, firms make more investment. As capital accumulation rises, marginal Q falls so that the 
fundamental value of the stock market also falls. This fall is dominated by the rise in the bubble component, causing the 
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stock price to rise on impact, and afterward raise investment. This in turn causes consumption to rise due to the wealth 
effect and raises output. This result indicates that the sentiment shock can generate a large volatility of the stock market 
relative to that of consumption, investment, and output. The sentiment shock has a negative impact on inflation. The 
capital stock rises due to positive sentiment shock, causing the labor hours to rise.  
In order to determine the central bank’s loss function, we estimate the loss function which is used to assess the policy 
rule’s performance. Table (6) presents the results for the defined function under investigation. 
Table 6. The Loss Function 
Values The Models 
0.00074 Baseline Model 
0.00006 Ramsey Optimal Monetary Policy 
Source: Authors calculation 
Table (6) shows that applying Ramsey optimal monetary policy relative to monetary regimes with money growth 
decreases the central bank loss function. 
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Source: Authors calculation 
Figure 1. Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation oil income shock, government’s consumption shock, a 
monetary policy shock, TFP shock and sentiment shock in the baseline model. 
 
Impulse responses to a sentiment shock Impulse responses to a government’s consumption shock 
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Source: Authors calculation 
Figure 2. Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation government’s consumption shock, a monetary policy shock, 
TFP shock and sentiment shock in the Ramsey Optimal Monetary Policy. 
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5. Conclusion 
Economics as macroeconomic policy objectives focus on full employment, price stability and sustainable economic 
growth. Economic growth is the most important economic variable that it shows sensitivity than other economic 
variable changes. Therefore, achieving sustainable economic growth requires the mobilization and allocation of 
resources at the national level and the development of financial markets. 
The role of monetary policy after the financial crisis in 2007-2009, as an example of speculative bubbles in financial 
markets, due to the economic and social effects of asset price fluctuation and the impact of cyclical fluctuation in 
economic variables has become an important issue in monetary policy and it is the concern of policymakers. 
In recent years there has been increasing interest in modelling rational bubbles in the literature. This paper investigates 
how the monetary policy should be conducted in a stock market bubble and fluctuation in aggregate variables within a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for Iranian economy. 
This study models the role of monetary policy including money growth and Ramsey optimal monetary policy in the 
new Keynesian monetary framework with nominal wage and price rigidities. We set model based on Ikeda (2013) with 
applying “Money in Utility” approach suitable for Iranian economy to derive optimal monetary policy is used by central 
banks to reduce the losses.  
Bubbles in our model emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism supported by self-fulfilling beliefs. The 
sentiment shock, which represents the size of current bubbles relative to newly born bubbles, causing bubbles 
movement and it transfers to the real economy through endogenous credit constraint. Moreover, this study investigates 
the impulse and response between sentiment shock and fluctuation in aggregate variables. 
In this study, the quarterly data after applying the log transformation, seasonal adjustment and detrended with the HP 
filter are used for calibration the parameters. We study the oil income shock, in addition to the TFP shock, the monetary 
policy shock, the government spending shock, the sentiment shock such as study by Ikeda (2013). 
Results show that: first, applying Ramsey optimal monetary policy in relative to monetary regimes with money growth 
decreases the loss function. Second, the sentiment shock drives the movements of stock market fluctuations and 
variations in real economy, leading to explain the positive contemporaneous correlation between stock prices and the 
real economy and it explains the business cycles in Iran. Third, the sentiment shock under the optimal monetary policy 
performs the same as monetary policy rule with money growth in explaining stock price fluctuations. The results of 
calibrated model revealed a relation between moments of variables in the model and moments of real data in the 
economy. Therefore, this model can help us to analysis the effect of stock market bubbles on macroeconomic variables 
in economy. 
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Appendix  
We present a formal derivation of the model in section 3. We report them here for completeness.  
A wage-setting problem is formulated as follows;  
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Subject to a demand curve for labor (8) and the definition for constant wage which cannot reoptimize (7), the 
wage-setting problem’s FOC with respect to )( jW t is; 
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(A.2) 
The wage evolves according to follows, which dividing through by 1tW and rearranging yields the relative wage of 
optimizers as an increasing function of the inflation rate; 
 
 
 
 
w
w
w
w
w
w
w
w
w
w
ww
www
w
ww
w
w
tt
t
t
w
t
t
w
lwlw
tw
t
t
t
t
tt
w
lwlw
tw
t
t
lwlw
tw
t
tt
w
t
t
t
t
lwlw
t
w
t
t
w
t
t
t
lwlw
twtwt
w
w
W
W
W
W
w
W
Ww
W
W
W
Ww
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
WWW































































































1
1
1
,1^
^
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
,
1
)(1
))(1(
)()()(
))(1()()()(
)()())(1()(
)
)()(
())(1()(
])()[()1(
1
1
 
(A.3) 
Subject to (23), (25), (26), (27) and substituting the capital stock (16) into the problem satisfies; 
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(A.4) 
The (A.4)’s FOC with repect to 
j
tI  yields the Lagrangean as; 
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Profit maximization leads to the following first order condition: 
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(A.6) 
The first-order condition for the solution of the above problem implies that all firms revising their price at time t will 
choose a common optimal price level, )(iPt  , set according to the following log-linear rule; 
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(A.7) 
Subject to a demand curve for output (38) and the definition for constant price which cannot reoptimize (40), the 
price-setting problem’s FOC with respect to )(iP t is; 
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(A.8) 
Evaluating this integral taking into account the price set by current-period optimizers and taking into account that firms 
which do not reoptimize price are selected randomly, we obtain (after rearranging); 
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(A.9) 
The aggregate output evolves according to, we substitute (65) into (14), using (20) and aggregating over j ; 
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